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ABSTRACT 
  
This study examines the role of specialist auditors in enhancing the quality of financial 
statements by taking into account industry complexity. The test of hypotheses are conducted 
in two steps. The first step is to provide evidence that earnings quality, measured by earnings 
persistent, of firms operating in the complex and non-complex industry are different. The 
second step is to compare the absolute abnormal accruals of companies engaged in the 
complex industry with those from non-complex industry audited by non-specialist and 
specialists auditors. Results show: 1) earnings persistence of firms in complex industries are 
lower than those in non-complex industries. 2) absolute abnormal accruals of firms operating 
in complex industries are higher than those in non-complex industries regardless industry 
specialization. Overall, the results suggest that auditor industry expertise does not play a 
significant role in improving the quality of audited earnings in complex business environ-
ment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Firm business environment may affect the 
reliability of financial statements to reflect firm 
economic reality. A sophisticated business environ-
ment creates uncertainty causing accountants to 
face difficulties in assessing the impact of events 
and transactions on company’s resources. The 
situation may lead to inappropriate accounting 
policy choices and ultimately hinder financial 
statements users in making effective business 
decisions. Bushman et al. [1] argue that firm 
complexity due to business and geographic line 
diversification decreases transparency. Firms ope-
rating in a particular industry where rapid 
environment changes occur very often will have 
high obstacles in recording business transactions. 
Francis and Gunn [2] supported the view stating 
that accounting industry complexity arises from 
difficulties in mapping economic activities into 
generally accepted accounting principles (GPPA), 
and accounting rules as basis for measurement of 
assets, liabilities, revenues, costs, and owner's 
equity. 
Francis and Gunn [2] illustrated the account-
ing complexity of computer and software sectors. 
They stated that ordinary business practice requir-
es firms in these industries to bundle multiple 
products together, such as providing after-sale 
services, free software updates, and assisting 
installation or providing assistance with software 
problems. Revenue recognition for the particular 
transactions requires firms to apply multiple 
deliverable accounting rules. These rules are quite 
complicated. Firms have to estimate selling price 
for each separate unit of accounting that require 
thorough understanding of the industry’s products 
and services. Recognizing revenue from transac-
tions involving different accounting rules are 
difficult to accomplish and might induce measure-
ment errors. The situation might lead to low 
quality of audited earnings. 
Bushman et al. [1] use earnings timeliness to 
assess the impact of firm complexity on reported 
earnings. They found that firm complexity mea-
sured by industrial and geographic concentrations 
affects earnings timeliness. Meanwhile, Doyle et al. 
[3] find that firms with weak internal control 
systems tend to engage in complex business acti-
vities and to have poor financial conditions.  
Plumlee and Yohn [4] investigated factors 
leading to increasing restatement in the US during 
2003-2006. The restatement was used as an 
indicator of earnings quality. They found that 37% 
of restament were related to the application of 
accounting standards. As much as 58% of restating 
firms were due to uncertainty in accounting 
standards, and 37% were related to the use of 
judgment in applying accounting standards. The 
evidence suggests that increasing restatements in 
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the US was partly because the inability of firms to 
correctly interpret and choose the most appropriate 
accounting policies in complex situation. When 
firms subsequently discover errors and misaplica-
tion of GAAP, restatement of finansial statements 
are to be made. 
Prior Empirical results support the positive 
relationship between industry specialization and 
audit quality. Dunn and Mayhew [5] argued that 
the auditor with industry specialization improve 
the quality of audited earnings largely because 
they provide audit services that differ from other 
accounting firms. Industry specialist auditors can 
differentiate services that separate them from com-
petitors who have no expertise in a particular 
industry. Previous studies on the relationship bet-
ween auditor industry specialization and earnings 
quality reported consistent results [6,7,8]. Other 
studies had investigated the association between 
auditor industry expertise and audit fees and found 
that audit fees for specialist auditors were higher 
than non-specialist auditors [9,10,11,12,13]. 
In contrast, previous studies in Indonesia exa-
mining the association between auditor industry 
expertise and audit quality reported mixed results. 
Several studies reported positive association bet-
ween industry specialist auditors and audit quality 
[14,15,16,17,18,19]. Other studies found negative 
association [20]. Meanwhile, some studies fail to 
provide evidence on the association between indus-
try expertise and audit quality [21,22,23,24,25]. 
The mixed results may stem from different 
proxies employed for audit quality, industry spe-
cializations or different samples periods. For 
example, Setiawan and Fitriani [14] used discre-
tionary accruals as audit quality proxy and 10% 
audit market share as a threshold for industry 
specializations. Herusetya [21] used earnings res-
ponse coefficients as a measure of audit quality. 
They also employed 15% and 30% threshold to 
classify auditors as industry specialists. Further-
more, the mixed results may be attributable to the 
researcher's assumption that industry expertise is 
relevant to all type of industries. 
This study attempts to explain the mixed 
results of prior auditor industry specialization 
studies in Indonesia. As far as authors’ knowledge, 
no previous research has ever been conducted to 
explain the phenomenon. We argue that industry 
complexity may explain the inconsistent results of 
previous studies in Indonesia. Firms operating in 
complex industries have difficulties in applying 
accounting rules required by GAAP. In effect, the 
reported earnings of firms in complex sectors 
contain higher noise than those operating in less 
complicated areas. Unlike Francis and Gunn [2], 
we argue that auditor industry expertise is only 
relevant and to play a significant role in improving 
earnings quality of firms in less complicated 
industries. In addition this study also investigates 
the effect of industry complexity on non-specialist 
auditors. It is expected that earnings quality of 
firms in complex industry audited by non-specialist 
auditors is of lower quality than firms in non-
complex industry audited by non-specialist audi-
tors.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Accounting Industry Complexity 
 
Diversification of business causes significant 
changes to firm operational and control activities 
that a good corporate governance system must be 
established. Busman et al. [1] stated that multi-
industry and multinational companies posing com-
plex managerial environments experience monitor-
ing and control issues. Good monitoring systems 
should be developed to coordinate cross-border 
corporate activities. Differences in geography, cur-
rency, audit costs, legal systems, language, tax 
systems, financial restrictions, and culture may 
lead to information complexities [26,27,28].  
The cause and consequences of diversification 
have become important topics and filled academic 
literatures. Dennis et al. [27] reported that the 
costs of diversification are higher than its benefits. 
The mounting costs are due to increased agency 
costs between managers and shareholders. Increa-
sed agency costs will hurt capital allocation and 
distract manager focus. Furthermore, the diverse 
corporate activities and unrelated segments lead to 
the emergence of organizational culture conflicts 
and operational styles that distract managers from 
more strategic tasks. Owen and Polk [29] reported 
evidence that diversification was negatively related 
to firm value. They concluded that diversification 
destroys company value. 
In addition to the lowering corporate value, 
the diversification also encourages a severe infor-
mation gap between parties within the company, 
and with outside investors [30]. Diversification 
causes business activities and enterprise informa-
tion systems to become increasingly sophisticated 
[1]. Givoly et al. [31] argued that diversification 
makes segment reporting to be less informative. 
They compare firms with one business line with 
more than one line of businesses. They found that 
the measurement errors of more than one line of 
business segment are higher than firms with one 
business line. Peterson [32] examined whether 
accounting complexities increase the likelihood of 
revenue restatements. They showed that the com-
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plexity of revenue measurement increases the 
probability of revenue restatements. Moreover, the 
revenue restatements occur due to intentional and 
unintentional reporting errors. 
 
Auditor Industry Specialist 
 
Auditor knowledge of accounting are critical 
factors that improve audit quality. According to 
Danos [33], there are at least five categories of 
knowledges required to perform audit: general 
auditing, functional areas (e.g., tax and computer-
based auditing), accounting issues (leasing and 
pensions), industry issues, and clients’ businesses. 
The category one, two, and three can be obtained 
through formal education. But it is rare for a per-
son to have all the necessary accounting and 
auditing knowledge in audit engagement. The 
category four and five are not entirely the domain 
of professional accountants. Knowledge of industry 
is particularly important when auditors are 
performing audits in industries that possess diffe-
rent or unique accounting rules. Knowledge of 
client businesses helps auditor to identify potential 
problems and communicate them with company 
employees. 
Referring to Porter [34], Mayhew and Wilkins 
[35] proposed arguments to explain why speciali-
zation is required for accounting firms. In the 
context of Porter’s competitive advantage, account-
ing firms should attempt to identify ways that can 
differentiate them from competitors by providing 
high-quality services that other accounting firms 
are difficult to mimic. By focusing on differen-
tiation, the accounting firm creates opportunities to 
meet the client's unique needs. The accounting 
firm must provide unique services which cannot be 
readily imitated by competitors. The differentiation 
should be directed to the characteristics of clients 
and the type of services required, such as size, the 
number of segments, industry membership, 
regulation, and capital sources [36]. Mayhew and 
Wilkins [35] stated that client industry member-
ship is the essential dimension that can be used to 
identify the need of clients. Industry specialization 
is important because it allows accounting firms to 
handle differentiation strategies to meet the needs 
of a large group of companies having the same 
characteristics. Industry specialization is expected 
to have positive impact on an accounting firm 
income. 
Empirical studies on auditor industry speciali-
zation suggest that industry specialist auditors are 
paid higher than non-specialists. Craswell et al. [9] 
reported higher audit fees received by auditors 
with industry specialization in Australia’s audit 
market on 1987. Hogan and Jeter [10] investigated 
the market share of accounting firms with industry 
specialization. They provided evidence that the 
degree of audit concentration had increased during 
1976 to 1993. Meanwhile, Ferguson [11] document-
ed evidence that market perceptions and apprecia-
tion for auditor industry expertise in Australia 
were primarily based on industry leadership at 
office-level and city level expertise. This is consis-
tent with evidence in Choi et al. [12] and Reichelt 
and Wang [13] suggesting that audit market is 
dominated by city-specific markets. 
 
Earnings Quality 
 
Conceptual arguments and explanation con-
cerning earnings quality have become a critical 
academic discussion in the accounting literature. 
But differences in definitions and how to measure 
it still exist to these days. According to Dichev et al. 
[37], various measurements have been proposed 
and used in earnings quality empirical researchers; 
including earnings persistence, predictability, 
asymmetric loss measurements, benchmark beat-
ing forms, income smoothing, magnitude of accru-
als, income increasing accruals, absolute abnormal 
accruals, and the extent to which accruals are 
mapped to cash flow. For auditor industry spe-
cialization, studies found that auditor industry 
specialists have higher earnings quality [6,7]. The 
findings are consistent with argument that indus-
try-specific auditors are able to position themselves 
differently to produce higher audit quality [38]. 
High audit quality is also associated with major 
investments in technology, physical facilities, 
employees, and organizational control systems that 
enable industry specialist auditors to detect 
irregularities and misstatements more easily [39]. 
Their ability to produce higher audit quality 
derives from the accumulation of experiences they 
obtain from companies in the same sectors and 
knowledge of best practice in different sectors. 
Khrisnan and Yang [40] used earnings res-
ponse coefficients as a proxy for earnings quality. 
The results showed that the reported earnings of 
firms with industry specialist auditor have higher 
earnings response coefficient relative to non-
specialist auditors. Carcello and Nagy [41] found a 
negative association between industry specialist 
auditors and fraudulent financial statements. 
Balsam et al. [7] showed that the absolute ab-
normal accruals of firms with industry specialist 
auditor were smaller than those of non-industry 
specialists. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Accounting complexity arises from the inhe-
rent difficulty in applying accounting standards 
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and mapping firm economic activities into account-
ing rules as a basis for recognizing and measuring 
accounting elements such as assets, liabilities, 
revenues, costs and owner's equity [2]. The 
accounting complexity requires specific accounting 
knowledge to identify potential problems in client 
financial statements [33]. Business trends and 
jargon used in industry are often unique and solely 
belong to the industry. 
In some industries such as the service sector, 
the business model is not complicated. Firms pose 
no difficulties to implement GAAP. In contrast, 
industries such as software development or con-
struction sector with long life cycles have more 
complex business models. The peculiar business 
practices make it difficult for accountants to choose 
appropriate accounting treatments. Transactions 
in those industries are often involved cash. There-
fore, the inherent difficulty in applying GAAP in 
complex industries should be expected to affect the 
quality of reported earnings. Since it has higher 
likelihood of estimation error and contains noise 
signals, earnings in the complex industries are 
expected to be less persistent than firms in less 
complicated industries. Arguments connecting 
industrial complexity and earnings characteristics 
are expressed in the following hypotheses: 
H1: Earnings in complex industries are less per-
sistent than those in non-complex industries. 
 
A large body of research on the association of 
auditor industry specialization and earnings attri-
bute [40,7,42] assume that auditor industry exper-
tise is relevant to all type of industries. In other 
words, industry specialist can always provide 
higher audit quality regardless of the type of 
industries firms belong. However, Francis and 
Gunn [2] objected the assumptions saying that 
non-industry specialist auditors can audit financial 
statements as good as specialist auditors if clients 
operate in non-complex industries. 
Dichev et al. [37] identified various measures 
of earnings quality, including asymmetric loss 
measurements, various forms of benchmark-beat-
ing, the magnitude of accruals, income increasing 
accruals, absolute abnormal accruals, and the 
extent to which accruals are mapped into cash 
flows. Prior studies on the association between 
auditor industry expertise and earnings quality 
documented evidence that firms with industry 
specialist auditors have higher earnings quality 
measured by low abnormal absolute accruals 
[6,7,43,3]. However, Francis and Gunn [2] argued 
that industry complexity brings advantage to 
specialist auditors because they can exploit their 
industry expertise relative to non-specialist 
auditors. 
In less complicated industries financial report-
ing issues are less complicated. Audit judgments in 
assessing and interpreting GAAP are much easier 
to exercise. In contrast, economic events or tran-
sactions in complex industries are difficult to 
measure with a high degree of certainty. This is 
due to estimations and assumptions that accoun-
tants have to make in relation to future events. In 
such situations, auditors can no longer rely on 
knowledge and audit skills to assess client’s 
accounting policies but on discretion alone. The 
previous knowledges and experiences are less 
relevant when dealing with uncertain situations. 
Therefore it is expected that audit performance of 
specialist auditors vary considerably in complex 
industries relative to less-complex industries. As a 
result, the quality of audited earnings measured by 
absolute abnormal accruals will be decreased. In 
other words, absolute abnormal accruals of firms 
operating in complex business environments are 
expected to be higher relative to those operating in 
less complex environments. Arguments connecting 
absolute abnormal accruals, industry complexity 
and industry specialization auditors are expressed 
in the following alternative hypothesis: 
H2: Absolute abnormal accruals of firms with audit 
industry specialists are greater in complex 
industries than those in non-complex indus-
tries. 
 
The two hypotheses above emphasize the 
effect of industry complexity on the ability of 
auditors in detecting rrors in financial statements. 
It is argued that the negative impact of industry 
complexity on audit performance will also present 
in clients with non-industry specialization. In fact, 
the effect is predicted to be greater. Without 
sufficient knowledge and experience of business 
practices in complex industrial environments, non-
specialist auditors will pose severe obstacles in 
performing the audit with unprecedented economic 
events. Accounting complexity surrounding tran-
sactions in the complex environment is so high that 
makes difficult for non-specialist auditors to exploit 
their industry specialization in determining the 
most appropriate accounting treatments. Incorrect 
estimates and improper accounting policy choices 
increase absolute abnormal accruals contained in 
audited earnings. In contrast, in less-complex 
industrial environments, auditing expertise of non-
specialist auditors are relevant and useful. Estima-
tion errors and misleading accounting policies can 
be reduced and eliminated. As a consequence, 
abnormal accruals contained in audited earnings 
are smaller. The argument leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
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H3:  Absolute abnormal accruals of firms with non-
specialists auditorsare greater incomplex indus-
tries than those in non-complex industries. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Population and Sample 
 
The population of this study are all listed 
companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, and 
the samples are firms releasing complete financial 
statements with necessary information to measure 
research variables during 2012-2015. Firms 
belonging to the financial industry (banks, 
insurance, and other financial institutions) are 
excluded due to different characteristics of 
accruals. Miscellaneous industry is also excluded 
because it is difficult to compare it with industrial 
grouping proposed in Francis and Gunn [2]. 
Francis and Gunn [2] separated firms into complex 
and non-complex industries based on thorough 
analysis of firm dynamics environments. Data are 
obtained from annual report uploaded online by 
Indonesian Stock Exchange and can be accessed 
via www.bei.co.id. However, annual reports of 
public companies which are not available on the 
official website of Indonesian Stock Exchange, are 
collected from company's official website and other 
sources from the internet with the help of Google 
search engine. If annual reportof firms cannot be 
collected from all indicated sources then they are 
eliminated from the sample.  
Table 1 presents the sampling procedure in 
detail. The number of firms satisfying the criteria 
for 2012-2015 are 130 firms samples. Thus 520 
(130 x4) observations are available for further 
analysis. 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure 
Criteria Total 
Firms were listed on IDX in 2015 532 
Firms are consecutively listed from 2012-2015 (71) 
Firms belong to financial, insurance, and 
miscellaneous industry is excluded. 
(219) 
Annual reports areavailable in Rupiah (20) 
Annual report canbe downloaded from data 
sources 
(92) 
Final Sample 130 
 
Variable Measurements 
 
Accounting Industri Complexity  
 
Firm samples are classified into industry 
groups based on Jakarta Stock Industrial Classi-
fication (JASICA). The grouping is available on 
IDX FACT BOOK. Based on JASICA, firms are 
grouped into 9 sectors: Agriculture (1), Mining (2), 
Basic Industry and Chemicals (3), Miscellaneous 
Industry (4), Consumer goods Industry (5), Pro-
perty, Real Estate And Building Construction (6), 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation (7), 
Finance (8) and Trade, Service & Investment (9). 
The criteria to clasify firms into into complex 
and non-complex industries follow Francis and 
Gunn [2]. A complete list of complex and non-
complex firms based on Francis and Gunn [2] are 
described in the appendix. Firm samples classi-
fication under JASICA will be compared to the list 
of industry groups proposed in Francis and Gunn 
[2] to determine whether companies are in complex 
or less complex industrial categories. For example, 
under JASICA PT. Astra Argo Lestari is classified 
as agriculture industry. Based on Francis and 
Gunn [2], the agriculture industry is categorized as 
a complex industry. Thus, PT. Astra Argo Lestari 
is a firm that belongs to the complex industry. 
However, miscellaneous industry under JASICA is 
eliminated because it is difficult to determine 
whether the industry is categorized as a complex or 
non-complex industry. 
 
Earnings Persistent 
 
Following Sloan [44], earnings persistent is 
measured as coefficient regression of current year 
earnings on prior year earnings. Below is the 
model to estimate earnings persistent:  
Earnings =  α + β1 Earnings-1 + ε  (1) 
 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for firms 
operating in complex and less complex industries. 
Hypothesis one was then tested by comparing the 
regression coefficients for each industry group 
using a non-parametric statistical test of two sam-
ples Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z. 
 
Abnormal Accruals 
 
Four different models are employed to esti-
mate abnormal accruals. However, performance 
matched discretionary model proposed by Kothari 
et al. [45] is used as a basis for accepting or 
rejecting the hypotheses. The model controls for 
the effect of firm performance on accruals and is 
widely used in earnings management research. 
While the rest of the models are used to assess the 
consistency of the results (robustness check). The 
four models are described below. 
a. Kothari Model [45] 
 ACCRt//TAt-1 = β0 + β1(SALEi,t/TAt-1) + β2 
(PPEt/TAt-1) + β3 (ROA,t/TAt-1) + εi,t    (2) 
 ACCRt is the total accruals on year t obtained 
from the difference between earnings before 
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extraordinary items and discontinued operation 
and cash flow (CFO), TAt-1 is a prior year total 
asset, ΔSALEt represents a change in sales in 
year t, PPEt represents equipment, plant, and 
property in year t and ROAt is a continuing 
operating income deflated by total assets. The 
model is estimated pool-cross-sectional for each 
industry. The abnormal accruals are residual 
from the regression model. Abnormal accruals 
are then transformed into an absolute value 
and served as a proxy for earnings quality. 
b. Ball dan Shivakumar Model [46]. 
 ACCRt//TAt-1=1(1/TAt-1)+2(SALEt-ΔRECt/TAt-
1) + 3(PPEt/TAt-1) + α4(CFOt/TAt-1)+ α5D_CFOt+ 
α6(CFOt/ TAt-1)* D_CFOt +et (3) 
 ACCRit is similar to Kothari model, CFOt is the 
operating cash flow for the current year, TAt-1 is 
total asset in t-1, ΔSALEt represents the change 
in sales in year t, ΔRECt is the change in 
receivables in year t,D_CFOt is a dummy 
variable, 1 if the operating cash flow is positive 
and 0 otherwise, and PPEt represents equip-
ment, plant, and property in year t. This model 
is cross-sectionaly estimated for the entire 
observation period. 
c. Modified Jones Model [47]. 
 ACCRt//TAt-1 = 1 (1/TAt-1) + 2(SALEt-ΔREC/ 
TAt-1) + 3(PPEt/TAt-1) + et   (4) 
 All variables are defined and measured the 
same way as in Kothari Model and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006). 
d. Kasznik Model [48]. 
 ACCRi, t//TAi,t-1 = 1 (1/TAi,t-1) + 2(SALEi,t/TAi,t-
1) + 3(PPEi,t/TAi,t-1) +α4(ΔCFOi,t/TAi,t-1) + ei,t  (5) 
All variables in this model are defined and 
measured the same way as in Modified Jones 
Model, Kothari Model, and Ball and Shiva-
kumar model. 
 
Auditor Industry Specialist 
 
Following Kwon et al. [42], auditor's market 
share is used to determine whether an accounting 
firm has industry expertise. Auditor market share 
are computed as follows: 
Auditor market share =


 

Ik
i
Jik
j
ijk
Jik
j
ijk
Sale
Sale
1 1
1
 (6) 
 
The numerator is the total sales of all clients 
audited by accounting firm i in industry k. The 
denominator is the sum of the total sales of all 
firms in industry k. An accounting firm is consi-
dered as having industry specialization if it con-
trols more than 20 percent of the audit market 
share [35]. 
Control variables 
 
Five control variables are added to control the 
impact of firm characteristics. They are firm size 
(total assets), debt to asset ratio, profitability 
(return on asset), and operating cash flow. Control 
variables are included to reduce errors in variables 
to anticipate the effects of omission of variables. 
 
Model Specifications 
 
Hypothesis One 
 
Hypothesis one predicts that earnings persis-
tence of firms in complex industries are lower than 
those in less complex industries. The hypothesis is 
tested using a non-parametric statistical test of two 
samples Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z. 
 
Hypothesis Two 
 
Hypothesis two examines the audit quality 
among specialist auditors in complex and non-
complex industries. Hypothesis two predict ear-
nings quality of firms, measured by absolute ab-
normal accruals, with auditor industry specialists 
are greater in complex industries relative to those 
in less complex industries. The following is the 
model to test hypothesis two: 
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = β0 + β1Industryt + β2Levt + β3 
ROAt+ β4 Ln_Sizet+β5CFOt-1 + εt        (7) 
Where,  
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = Absolute abnormal accruals are 
estimated separately using four different models 
and are transformed into natural logarithm; 
Industryt = Dummy variable, 1 if the specialist 
auditor belong to complex industries and 0 
otherwise; Levt= Ratio of total debt to total assets; 
ROAt= Ratio of net income to total assets in year t; 
Ln_Sizet= The size of the firm that is transformed 
into natural logarithm; CFOt= Operating cash flow 
deflated by total assets 
It should be noted that the abnormal accruals 
are transformed into absolute values to avoid 
negative and positive abnormal accruals cancel out. 
Such a situation may obscure the interpretation of 
the results. As discussed extensively in the 
accounting literature, negative abnormal accruals 
decrease reported earnings while positive ab-
normal accruals increase earnings. However, both 
are the result of manager discretion causing noises 
in reported earnings. Since this present study does 
not focus on the direction of abnormal accruals but 
the magnitude of abnormal accruals, absolute 
abnormal accruals are appropriate proxy for 
earnings quality. Absolute abnormal accruals are 
then transformed into natural logarithms because 
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transforming abnormal accruals into absolute ab-
normal accruals causing data skewed to the right 
and potentially violate the assumption of nor-
mality. Transforming absolute abnormal accruals 
into natural logarithm follows Carcello et al. [49]. 
 
Hypothesis Three 
 
Hypothesis three examines audit quality 
among non-specialist auditors incomplex and non-
complex industries. The following is the model to 
test hypothesis three: 
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = β0 + β1Industryt + β2Levt + β3 
ROAt+ β4 Ln_Sizet + β5CFOt-1 + εt    (8) 
 
Where, 
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = Absolute abnormal accruals 
models estimated separately using four different 
models and are subsequently transformed into 
natural logarithms; Industryt = Dummy variable, 1 
if the non-specialist auditor belongs to complex 
industries and 0 otherwise; Levt = Ratio of total 
debt to total assets; ROAt = Ratio of net income to 
total assets in year t; Sizeit= ln total asset; CFOt= 
Operating cash flow deflated by total assets. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
There are 520 firm samples available during 
the 2012-2015 period. Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics for variables related to auditor industry 
expertise and non-industry expertise. Panel A is 
descriptive statistics for firms using auditor indus-
try specialization and panel B for non-industry 
specialization. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Specialist Auditor    
Variable N 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Mean Std.Dev 
Abs_Akrual 288 0,000 0,687 0.074 0.082 
Industry 288 0,000 1,000 0,240 0.430 
LEV 288 0,000 2,460 0,541 0,368 
ROA 288 -0,720 0,490 0,061 0,101 
SIZE 288 3,641 8,211 6,210 0,852 
CFO 288 -0,610 0,940 0,081 0,145 
Panel B: Non-specialist auditor 
Abs_Akrual 232 0,000 0,351 0,063 0,058 
Industry 232 0,000 1 0,410 0,492 
LEV 232 0,000 1,460 0,476 0,270 
ROA 232 -0,210 2,05 0,103 0.174 
SIZE 232 4,942 7,963 6.246 0.714 
CFO 232 -1, 840 1,030 0.085 0.209 
 
Absolute abnormal accruals (Abs_Akrual) pre-
sented in table 2 are estimated using model 
introduced in Kothariet al. [45]. Panel A shows the 
mean for absolute abnormal accruals is 7.4%  of 
total assets for firms in complex industries and 
6.3% of the total asset for non-complex industries 
(panel B). Though two companies report high 
abnormal accruals of 68.7% and 35.1% respectively 
for each industry, on average earnings manage-
ment level is quite moderate. 
It can also be seen from Panel A and B, 
Industry has mean value of 24% and 41% respec-
tively. They suggest that 24% of auditors who have 
industry expertise are hired by firms operating in 
complex industries, and 41% are employed by firms 
operating in non-complex industries. The statistics 
also show that the number of auditors who have 
industry expertise is lower than those who have no 
industry specialization. This is understandable be-
cause to gain adequate knowledge of a complex 
industry requires auditors to have a strong 
commitment to learning continually about the 
company's business activities. Not all auditors are 
willing to invest time and effort to understand 
complex industrial environments.  
This study uses four control variables. They 
are LEV (debt level), ROA (profitability), SIZE 
(company size), and CFO (cash flow). On average, 
the firm samples in complex and non-complex 
industries have a reasonably safe level of debt that 
is below 1. This is reflected from a low debt ratio of 
0.541 for the complex industries and 0.476 for non-
complex industries. Meanwhile, profitability is also 
quite moderate. The mean for ROA is 0.061 and 
0.103 for complex and non-complex industries 
respectively. These figures suggest that on average, 
firms engaged in non-complex industries are more 
profitable than firms operating in complex 
industries. The firm is almost equal in size between 
the two industry groups. The same is true for the 
operating cash flow (CFO). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Hypothesis One (H1) predicts a complex 
industrial environment causing firms’ earnings to 
fluctuate sharply over the years resulting in lower 
earnings persistence. More specifically, H1 predicts 
earnings of firms operating in complex industries 
are less persistent than those in less complicated 
industries. Non-parametric statistical tests of two 
samples Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z are used to test 
the hypothesis. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is used 
because earnings persistence is not normally 
distributed. 
The results described in Table 3 show that Z 
statistics of the two-sided test is equal to 1.284 and 
p-value of 0.074. However, conclusions are drawn 
using one-tailed test because the hypothesis is 
stated in a certain direction. It can thus be con-
cluded that the earnings persistence (Asymp 0.074 
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/ 2 = 0.037) in the complex industries is lower than 
that of less complex industries. The results support 
the industry grouping proposed by Francis and 
Gunn [2]. 
 
Table 3. Differences in Persistence of Complex Profit 
Industry and Less Complex 
 Earnings Persistent 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1,284 
Asymp. Sig. (Two-tailed) ,074 
 
Firms engaged in complex business environ-
ments are more volatile because earnings measure-
ment is more difficult and contains higher mea-
surement errors than other companies operating in 
less complex industries. Danos [33] stated that the 
accounting complexity in specific industry requires 
accountants to have particular accounting know-
ledge to identify potential problems in clients' 
financial statements 
Hypothesis Two (H2) indicates that the know-
ledge of specialist auditors become less relevant in 
complex industries. Therefore it is predicted that 
absolute abnormal accruals of firms operating in 
complex industrial environments are expected to 
be higher than firms operating in less complex 
environments. The firms used to test H2 are 
limited to those audited by industry specialist 
auditor. As a consequence, Only 149 firm samples 
are available to test H2. Moreover, as much as 13 
firm samples must be eliminated to meet normality 
assumption underlying multiple regression analy-
sis. The final firm samples to test H2 is 136 obser-
vations. Table 4 summarizes the effect of industry 
complexity and specialist auditors on abnormal 
absolute accruals. 
It should be noted that the abnormal accruals 
shown in table 4 are estimated using performance-
matched discretionary accruals model introduced 
in Kothari et al. [45]. Inferences are drawn based 
on this model. The analysis focuses on industry 
variable which is a dummy variable that takes one 
if firms operating in a complex industry and 0 
otherwise. Table 4 shows the coefficient has a 
positive value and statistically significant at less 
than 1%. Positive directions indicate that the 
abnormal accruals of firms in the complex indus-
tries are higher than those of the less complex 
industries although both use industry specializa-
tion auditors. Hence, H2 is supported statistically. 
Overall, the findings suggest the auditor's 
industry expertise does not play a significant role 
in complex industries. The uncertain business 
environment makes it difficult for auditors to 
assess whether the accounting policies used by the 
company conform with accepted accounting stan-
dards. Moreover, the findings explain the incon-
sistent results reported by various studies in Indo-
nesia [14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,2324,25]. As des-
cribed earlier, some studies reported a positive 
association between industry specialist auditors 
and audit quality but some found a negative asso-
ciation. The result of the present research shows 
that industry complexity must be controlled to 
assess the effect of auditor industry expertise on 
audit quality. 
We perform further analysis to test the vali-
dity of the results. Sensitivity analysis is performed 
by re-estimating abnormal accruals using three 
different models that have been described earlier. 
Table 5 reports that the coefficients for Industry in 
all models have the positive direction. The results 
are consistent with evidence reported in table 4. 
However, the significance level of the three models 
varies, ranging from 1% for modified Jones, 5 % for 
Ball and Shivakumar model, and 10% for Kasznik 
model. Overall these results suggest that industry 
complexity cause the adverse effect on the quality 
of audited earnings.  
The industry complexity is predicted to not 
only decreases the ability of specialist auditors to 
assess and verify client's accounting policies but 
also the ability of non-specialist auditors. The 
relationship between industry complexity and non-
specialist auditors is stated in hypothesis three 
(H3). Hypothesis three emphasizes the pronounced 
effect of industry complexity on non-specialist 
auditors relative to specialist auditors in maintai-
ning the quality of financial statements. 
 
Table 4. Abnormal Accruals and Auditor Industry 
Expertise In Complex Industry 
 
Model: Ln_Abs_Akrualt = 0 + 1Industryt + 2Ln_SIZEt + 
3DARt + 4ROAt + 5CFOt + t 
 
Variables Predicted 
Signs 
Coefficie
nts 
Std. 
Error 
t-statis-
tics 
P-Value 
Industry  (+) 0,373 0,124 3,007 0,003 
Ln_Size (+) -0,044 0,037 -1,172 0,243 
DAR (+) 0,415 0,263 1,577 0,117 
ROA (+) 0,249 0,884 0,282 0,779 
CFO (+/-) 0,738 0,662 1,115 0,267 
N 135 
Adjusted R2 0,06 
 
Table 5. Abnormal Accruals and Auditor Industry Exper-
tise in Complex Industry (Alternative Models) 
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = 0 + 1Industryt + 2Ln_SIZEt + 3DARt 
+ 4ROAt + 5CFOt + t 
 
 
Ball dan 
Shivakumar 
Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Kasznik Model 
Coef.  Β p-value Coef.  β p-value Coef.  Β p-value 
Industry 0,272 0,033 0,392 0,002 0,248 0,087 
Ln_Size -0,037 0,313 -0,025 0,487 0,011 0,784 
DAR 1,270 0,000 0,386 0,145 0,026 0,931 
ROA 2,387 0,012 1,340 0.132 0,543 0,593 
CFO 0,009 0,989 -0,206 0,745 0,617 0,395 
N 132 
 
144 
  
140 
Adj. R2 0,190  0,054   0,012 
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Table 6 presents the impact of industry 
complexity on financial statements audited by non-
specialist auditors. It should be noted that the 
samples used to test H3 are limited to firms who 
hire non-specialist auditors. As a consequence, firm 
samples available to conduct regression analysis is 
down to 267 observations. As much as 31 firm 
samples were eliminated, leaving only 236 firm 
samples to test H3. The results are shown in Table 
6. The focus is on variable Industry which is a 
dummy variable that takes one if the firm operates 
in a complex industry and 0 otherwise. 
As seen in table 6, Industry has positive sign 
with a p-value of 0,045. Therefore, H3 is statis-
tically supported with the significant level at 5%. 
The results suggest that the absolute abnormal 
accruals of firms in complex industries are higher 
relative to firms operating in less complex indus-
tries even though they use non-specialist auditors. 
The results support previous findings that industry 
complexity hurts the quality of financial state-
ments.  
Robustness check is also conducted to assess 
whether the results are specific or dependent upon 
the model used. Table 7 summarizes the results 
using three alternative models. 
 
Table 6. Non-spesialist Auditors In Complex and Non-
complex Industry  
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = 0 + 1Industryt + 2Ln_SIZEt + 3DARt 
+ 4ROAt + 5CFOt + t 
Variables Predicted 
signs 
Coeffi-
cients 
Std. 
Error 
t-
statistics 
P-
Value 
Industry (+) 0,205 0,101 2,017 0,045 
Ln_Size (+) -0,009 0,030 --0,312 0,755 
DAR (+) 0,402 0,148 2,717 0,007 
ROA (+) -0,763 0,524 -1,456 0,147 
CFO (+/-) 3,397 0,540 6,293 0,000 
N 135 
Adjusted R2 0,17 
 
Table 7. Non-specialist Auditors In Complex and Non-
Complex Industry (Alternative Models) 
Ln_Abs_Akrualt = 0 + 1Industryt + 2Ln_SIZEt + 3DARt 
+ 4ROAt+5CFOt+ t 
 
 
Ball dan 
Shivakumar 
Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Kasznik Model 
Coef. Β p-value Coef. Β p-value Coef. Β p-value 
Industry 0,051 0,708 0,216 0,091 0,400 0,001 
Ln_Size -0,093 0,017 -0,042 0,254 -0,090 0,011 
DAR 0,874 0,000 0,467 0,002 0,435 0,001 
ROA -0,178 0,788 0,300 0.636 -0,095 0,872 
CFO 0,083 0,871 -0,535 0,277 0,126 0,804 
N 243 
 
256 
  
243 
Adj. R2 0,104  0,042   0,089 
Of the three models, only the Ball and Shiva-
kumar model fail to detect differences in absolute 
abnormal accrualsof firms with non-specialist audi-
tors in complex and non-complex industries. Kasz-
nik and modified Jones models support previous 
findings with a significance level of less than 1% 
and at 10%. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
 
Conclusions 
 
The assumption that the auditors who have 
industry specialization expertise can always im-
prove the quality of financial statements regardless 
of type of industries they operate are misleading. 
The complexity of industry may reduce or even 
eliminate the effect of auditor industry expertise. 
Knowledge of business practices and norms in 
particular industry are often unique and useful 
only in less complex industry. This study examines 
the importance of auditor industry expertise in 
improving the quality of financial statements by 
taking into account industry complexity.The fin-
dings are summed up as follows: 
1. Earnings Persistence of firms in complex indus-
tries is lower than firms in non- complex 
industry. 
2. Auditor industry expertise does not affect finan-
cial statements quality of firms operating in 
complex business environments. The result sug-
gests that investors should consider industry 
complexity before making investment decisions. 
Hiring public accounting firms who have indus-
try expertise are only appropriate for firms 
engaged in less complex industries. The spe-
cialist auditor alone is not enough to guarantee 
that the financial statements have reasonably 
reflected economics reality and firm prospects 
in the future. 
3. Absolute abnormal accruals of firms operating 
in complex industries are higher relative to 
those in-non complex industries despite the fact 
that they hire non-specialized industry audi-
tors. 
 
Several prior studies in Indonesia have shown 
industry-specific auditors play an important role in 
improving the quality of financial statements. But 
results of this present study suggest that the 
knowledge of business practices in an industry 
does not improve the ability of auditors in 
enhancing financial reporting quality of firms in 
complex business environments. Moreover, the 
significant effect of industry complexity on the 
quality of financial statements identified in this 
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study may explain the inconsistent results of pre-
vious auditor industry specialization studies in 
Indonesia. 
 
Limitations 
 
The data used in this study come from public-
ly available sources. Unfortunately annual reports 
of firm samples are not all available online during 
the sample period of 2012-2015. This might affect 
the results. Therefore, inferential should be taken 
cautiously in the context of firms sample and pe-
riods. 
The procedure to separate firms into a com-
plex and non-complex industry based on Jakarta 
Stock Industrial Classification could be too broad 
and fail to distinguish different environment dyna-
mics. Incorrect grouping might have affected the 
results reported in this study.  
 
Suggestions 
 
Following are two suggestions for future rese-
arch (1) Use different proxy for earnings quality 
such as earnings response coefficients, stock prices 
synchronicity and earnings timeliness, and (2) 
Subsequent research may consider the classifica-
tion of complexity by sub-industry. 
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List of Industries 
 
Complex Industries Non-Complex Industries 
Agriculture  Food Products 
Entertainment  Candy & Soda 
Healthcare  Beer & Liquor 
Construction  Recreation  
Defense  Printing and Publishing 
Precious Metals  Consumer Goods  
Non-metallic and Industrial Metal Mining  Apparel  
Coal  Medical Equipment  
Petroleum and Natural Gas  Pharmaceutical Products  
Utilities  Chemicals  
Communication  Rubber and Plastic Products  
Business Services  Textiles  
Computers  Construction Materials  
Transportation  Steelworks, etc. 
Banking  Fabricated Products  
Insurance  Machinery  
Real Estate  Electrical Equipment  
Trading Automobiles and Trucks  
 Aircraft  
 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment  
 Personal Services  
 Electronic Equipment  
 Measuring and Control Equipment  
 Business Supplies  
 Shipping Containers  
 Wholesale  
 Retail  
 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 
 Food Products 
 
